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Abstract of Thesis 
Throughout the 1930s, the Roosevelt administration enacted numerous federal 
programs under the umbrella of the New Deal; among these was a series of agriculture 
regulations designed improve the plight of the American farmer. In 1936, the Supreme 
Court invalidated the earliest of these programs, the 1934 Agricultural Adjustment Act, 
and two years after that decision, Roosevelt called a special session of Congress to enact 
replacement legislation for the earlier law. The resulting Agricultural Adjustment Act 
and Administration proved highly controversial and farmers from the upper Midwest to 
the deepest tip of Texas met this plan with drastically different reactions which ranged 
from open rebellion and lawsuits on one end, to joyous compliance on the other. This 
study focuses primarily on the political, regional, and economic differences that 
produced these disparate responses and argues that such reactions resulted chiefly from 
the degree of economic hardship experienced in any given region. Cotton farmers 
supported the law because they faced extreme economic distress from massive 
overproduction. Conversely, Midwestern corn farmers, who enjoyed greater economic 
prosperity, expressed ideological opposition to the law they found financially 
unnecessary. 
Chapter one of this work provides an in-depth analysis of the current literature in 
the field of New Deal agricultural legislation. The controversial nature of the act 
prompted reactionary and polemical studies almost immediately following its enactment. 
These works began with Anna Rochester’s Why Farmers are Poor, which took a sharply 





 Subsequent works embraced varying interpretations of the New Deal but, until 
recently, few studies examined the perspectives of the “dirt farmers” themselves. 
Contemporary scholarship erupted in 2002 with a host of new studies printed that year. 
Contrary to Rochester’s argument that the legislation fell short in achieving its goal, Jean 
Choate presented a disapproving picture of such programs, which she suggested went 
too far in attempting to secure stability and prosperity for the American farmer. Choate’s 
Disputed Ground (2002) discussed the major opposition groups to New Deal 
Agricultural programs with every organization featured in its own chapter.
2
 Through the 
eyes of these groups, Choate worked to reveal a disapproving public who wanted simply 
to be let alone by their government. Another example of these new works included 
Michael Johnston Grant’s work, Down and Out on the Family Farm: Rural 
Rehabilitation in the Great Plains, 1929-1945.
3
  Grant’s book pioneered the comparative 
case study approach embraced here. He selected a set of states grouped along regional 
boundaries and used the responses of those farmers to paint a local picture of the AAA. 
A thorough discussion of Grant’s work and its impact on Politics and Production Control 
can be found in chapter one. 
Following the analysis of secondary sources, chapters two through four each 
examine a single state and the responses of the farmers in those areas to the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration. Chapter two, “A Thankful Texas,” reveals the mindset of 
                                                 
1
 Anna Rochester, Why Farmers are Poor (New York: International Publishers Co.), 1940. 
 
2
 Jean Choate, Disputed Ground: Farm Groups that Opposed the "ew Deal Agricultural 
Program (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Co., 2002). 
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 Michael Johnston Grant, Down and Out on the Family Farm: Rural Rehabilitation in the Great 




cotton farmers in the largest cotton producing state in the nation. It demonstrates their 
great economic need at the time and uncovers some of the unique challenges faced by 
Texas growers which occasionally put them at odds with their colleagues in other states. 
“Oklahoma Optimism” studies Sooner state farmers in much the same way but provides 
examples of some marked ideological differences between them and their neighbors to 
the south. Both Oklahoma and Texas cotton farmers embraced the 1938 farm bill but 
each did so with an emphasis on the individualized interests of their own farmer 
populations. 
Chapter four, “Revolt in the Corn Belt,” offers a sharp contrast with the first two 
case studies. It examines a region that not only refused to embrace the legislation but 
waged an all out war against the program. This discussion of Illinois farmers illuminates 
the controversial and divisive nature of the AAA and provides additional insight into 
some farmers’ ideology of New Deal opposition. Corn growers at the time enjoyed 
higher crop prices than their counterparts in cotton and thus comfortably opposed the 
farm bill based on their commitment to freedom and their demand for fairness in the 
administration of federal regulations. They drifted away from this position, however, 
when they began to understand the degree to which they could benefit economically by 
designing and cooperating with alternative federal programs.  
The final chapter of this work places each of the case study states in historical 
context with one another and offers an expanded analysis of their similarities and 
differences. It demonstrates the impact of a region’s economic situation on that region’s 
response to the AAA and highlights the differences present between cotton and corn 




 Responses to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 resulted chiefly from the 
degree of economic hardship experienced in any given region. Cotton farmers supported 
the law because they faced extreme economic distress from massive overproduction. 
Conversely, Midwestern corn farmers, who enjoyed greater economic prosperity, 








In 1938, a poor “dirt farmer” in Manitou, Oklahoma, wrote to Senator Elmer 
Thomas seeking relief from the hard times at hand. In the letter Farmer Boyd related 
his story and explained:  
[I] am working 320 acres of farm land make good crops every 
year but haven’t made expences since 28… I will 71 years old in next 
month have no expencive habits don’t drink nor gamble only with the 
weather and grass hoppers haven’t bought a new car since 24 don’t 
know what a vacaion is only by reading about some taking them… I 
am writing you what twenty million farmers are thinking, right now 
the situation is charged with nitro, just takes a light jar to set it off. 
Quit giving us money [and] give us a chance. This thing has turned 
thousands of good men out in the section… destroying citizenship 
making beggars and bums out of once free men. As for myself I wont 
be here verry mutch longer… but I have four boys… not only them but 
the neighbors boys and tens of thousands of them all over this fair land 
that hasent got any more chance then a yard dog. I am asking you in all 
sincerity to do something about it before it is to late.1 
Boyd’s letter illustrated a passion for influencing farm policy despite his limited 
education and revealed a set of experiences all too familiar to a substantial majority of 
farm families at the time. Most struggled to meet their expenses, gave up all 
unnecessary purchasing, and feared for the future of their children on the farm. Their 
great need prompted legislators to initiate a program of federal farm assistance that 
would have a long-range impact, which still shapes American agriculture today. 
In the fifteen years from 1995 to 2010, America’s corn farmers received 
$73,775,277,671 in federal farm subsidies while cotton took second place on the 
                                                 
1 This excerpt is reproduced with all errors original to the manuscript in order to help reveal 
the experiences of farmers at the time. Letter from G. M. Boyd to Elmer Thomas, Box 28, 
Folder 10, Elmer Thomas Collection, Congressional Archives, Carl Albert Center, University 
of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma. 
 
2 
funding list, gathering roughly $30,000,000,000.2 When federal crop subsidies and 
farm legislation began in the 1930s, men like Boyd could never have imagined such 
staggering financial assistance that would one day account for over thirty-six percent 
of the average farm’s net income.3 At the time, policy-makers chiefly concerned 
themselves with alternative plans for support, specifically in the form of production 
controls. In 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called a special session of 
Congress to enact replacement farm legislation for the 1934 program that had been 
recently invalidated by the Supreme Court. The resulting Agricultural Adjustment 
Act and Administration (AAA) proved highly controversial and farmers from the 
upper Midwest to the deepest tip of Texas met this plan with drastically different 
reactions, from open rebellion and lawsuits on one end of the spectrum to tearfully 
joyous compliance on the other. This study focuses primarily on the political, 
regional, and economic differences that produced such disparate responses. 
While a vast number of agriculture producers suffered economic hardship in 
the 1930s, their experiences varied greatly based on world market conditions, 
environmental factors, and domestic consumption of their crop. Midwestern corn 
farmers often found themselves able to produce a livable income, or at the very least, 
converted their grain to feed for hog-raising operations. Additionally, the majority of 
their produce sold to domestic consumers, which protected them from dramatic 
swings occurring in the world market. Southern cotton men, however, quickly 
                                                 
2 Environmental Working Group, “Farm Subsidy Database,” Environmental Working Group, 
http://farm.ewg.org/region.php?fips=00000&progcode=total (accessed November 30, 2010). 
 




discovered that approximately one-third of their brethren were completely unable to 
support themselves with their traditional farms.4 These men did not possess the 
luxury of ideological opposition to the farm bill. They desperately needed it.  
This thesis will demonstrate that cotton farmers’ support for the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938 stemmed from the economic distress of massive 
overproduction. Conversely, growers in the Midwest who experienced greater 
economic prosperity revolted against the program based on their ideology of freedom 
and individual responsibility and a concern for their personal economy. 
Chapter one of this study provides an in-depth analysis of the current literature 
in the field of New Deal agricultural legislation. The controversial nature of the act 
prompted reactionary and polemical studies almost immediately following its 
passage. These works began with Anna Rochester’s Why Farmers are Poor, (1940), 
which took a sharply negative view of the AAA for not doing enough to promote the 
interests of the small farmer. 5 Subsequent works embraced varying interpretations of 
the New Deal, but, until recently, few studies examined the perspectives of the “dirt 
farmers” themselves. Contemporary scholarship erupted in 2002 with a host of new 
studies printed that year including Michael Johnston Grant’s work, Down and Out on 
the Family Farm: Rural Rehabilitation in the Great Plains, 1929-1945.6  Grant’s 
book pioneered the comparative case study approach embraced here. He selected a set 
of states grouped along regional boundaries and used the responses of those farmers 
                                                 
4 “Cotton Quota Vote Stirs AAA Anxiety,” ew York Times, 8 December 1938, 4. 
 
5 Anna Rochester, Why Farmers are Poor (New York: International Publishers Co. 1940). 
 
6 Michael Johnston Grant, Down and Out on the Family Farm: Rural Rehabilitation in the 
Great Plains, 1929-1945 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002). 
 
4 
to paint a local picture of the AAA. A thorough discussion of Grant’s work and its 
impact on Politics and Production Control can be found in chapter one. 
Following the analysis of existing literature, chapters two through four each 
examine a single state and the responses of the farmers in those areas to the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Chapter two, “A Thankful Texas,” reveals 
the mindset of cotton farmers in the largest cotton producing state in the nation. It 
demonstrates their great economic need at the time and uncovers some of the unique 
challenges faced by Texas growers, which occasionally put them at odds with their 
colleagues in other states. Farmers in the Lone Star state exported a higher percentage 
of their cotton than most domestic growers and thus encountered issues such as the 
impact of the Smoot-Hawley tariff more directly. Chapter three, “Oklahoma 
Optimism,” studies Sooner state farmers in much the same way but provides 
examples of some marked ideological differences between them and their neighbors 
to the south. Both Oklahoma and Texas cotton farmers embraced the 1938 farm bill 
but each did so with an emphasis on the individualized interests of their own farmer 
populations. 
Chapter four, “Revolt in the Corn Belt,” offers a sharp contrast with the first 
two case studies. It examines a region that not only refused to embrace the legislation 
but waged an all out war against the program. This discussion of Illinois farmers 
illuminates the controversial and divisive nature of the AAA and provides additional 
insight into some farmers’ ideology of New Deal opposition. Corn growers at the 
time enjoyed higher crop prices than their counterparts in cotton and thus comfortably 
opposed the farm bill based on their commitment to freedom and their demand for 
 
5 
fairness in the administration of federal regulations. They drifted away from this 
position, however, when they began to understand the degree to which they could 
benefit economically by designing and cooperating with alternative federal programs 
that did not require their compulsory participation in acreage reductions. While crops 
such as wheat have already been studied extensively under the AAA, the examination 
of corn and cotton together provides a new comparative analysis of the impact of the 
legislation, achieved by building on previous works and contrasting the sharpest 
responses from farmers at each end of the spectrum. 
The final chapter of this work places each of the case study states in historical 
context with one another and offers an expanded analysis of their similarities and 
differences. While the Corn Belt revolt against the AAA might appear moderate as an 
individual event in history, its radicalism and underlying economic concerns rise to 
the surface when viewed against the backdrop of the cotton South’s anxiousness for 
aid. In order to develop the clearest picture of these farmers and their interpretations 
of the AAA program, this work utilizes extensive newspaper collections and 
congressional archives to enable each grower to speak for himself through countless 






Review of Literature 
 
New Deal agricultural legislation has been examined by a host of authors and 
scholars, and each contributed unique interpretations to the literature in the field. 
Some of the earliest studies contained sharply polemical charges such as the 1940 
work by activist Anna Rochester, titled Why Farmers are Poor.
1
 In her study, 
Rochester strongly rebuked the AAA for failing to address the needs of small 
subsistence farmers and claimed that the majority of relief funding went 
inappropriately to large commercial operations.
2
 She also expressed powerful 
disapproval of benefit payments tied to program compliance rather than to individual 
need.
3
 Rochester wished to restructure the aid programs in order to correct for this 
perceived injustice by ending blanket subsidies and connecting loans with 
demonstrable need. Her work, clearly designed to pursue political change, offered an 
early glimpse into the divisive nature of New Deal interpretations that continued in 
varying degrees of severity throughout many of the subsequent studies. 
Dissatisfied with the negative interpretations and marginalization of New Deal 
agriculture leaders, brothers Edward and Frederick Schapsmeier provided a detailed 
study of Roosevelt’s most influential Secretary of Agriculture in Henry A. Wallace of 
                                                 
1
 Anna Rochester, Why Farmers are Poor (New York: International Publishers Co., 1940). 
 
2
 Ibid., 264. 
 
3




Iowa: The Agrarian Years, 1910-1940 (1968).
4
 Because his ideas powerfully shaped 
the policies of the Roosevelt administration, the personal philosophies and 
management ideas of Wallace are fundamental to a proper understanding of the AAA 
implementation. While most studies offer tiny windows into Wallace’s schemes like 
his “Ever Normal Granary,” this work detailed each plan and used archival holdings 
of Wallace’s writings to rehabilitate his image and credit him for most of the 
successes enjoyed by the AAA.
5
 Similarly, Dean Albertson’s Roosevelt’s Farmer 
(1961) chronicled the progression of Claude R. Wickard from his local administrative 
role in the AAA to his ultimate position as Secretary of Agriculture.
6
 Here, Albertson 
argued that Wickard’s occasional ineptness and “down home” personality made him 
the perfect selection for Agricultural Adjustment Administrator and later Cabinet 
Secretary because such personality traits increased his appeal to local farmers and 
invited their trust and cooperation with the controversial legislation.
7
 Albertson’s 
most unique and informative source material came from Claude R. Wickard’s 
personal diary and letter collection. These manuscripts powerfully inform the work 
                                                 
4
 Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Henry A. Wallace of Iowa: The Agrarian Years, 
1910-1940 (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1968), 282.  
 
5
 The “Ever Normal Granary” theory, as sketched out in Keith J. Volanto, Texas, Cotton, and 
the (ew Deal (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2005), 111, involved 
saving bumper crops in high yield years to sell for increased profits and to promote market 
stability in lean years; Schapsmeier, Henry A. Wallace of Iowa, x.  
 
6
 Dean Albertson, Roosevelt’s Farmer: Claude R. Wickard in the (ew Deal (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1961). 
 
7




with a glimpse into the farm leader’s mind at every major turn throughout the 
operation of the AAA.
8
 
Robert Snyder’s 1984 work Cotton Crisis marked the beginning of renewed 
academic interest in New Deal farm policy.
9
 One of the most valuable contributions 
of Snyder’s work on cotton is his incredible mining of local newspaper archives to 
paint a clear picture of public opinion about the hardships faced by the affected 
growers.
10
 His notes brim with selections from the Houston Chronicle to the Wall 
Street Journal and every paper in between. Snyder argued that environmental 
conditions, including drought and the reluctance of farmers to engage in soil 
conservation, played the biggest role in creating the “cotton crisis” but he failed to 
consider the important impact of economic factors such as the Smoot-Hawley tariff 
and international production. Through this study, the author proposes to contribute 
this perspective to the existing body of literature. 
R. Douglas Hurt’s numerous contributions to the field of agricultural history 
range from broad overviews to narrowly tailored analyses of issues in American 
farming. His 1981 study, The Dust Bowl: An Agricultural and Social History, 
approached early twentieth century U.S. agriculture policy from the minds of the Dust 
Bowl land owners and tenant farmers.
11
 He argued that landowning farmers in the 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., 128. 
 
9




 Ibid., 14. 
 
11
 R. Douglas Hurt, The Dust Bowl: An Agricultural and Social History (Chicago: Nelson 




most heavily affected region welcomed the opportunity to earn additional money 
under the original AAA.
12
 He also presented a new map of the Dust Bowl, that 
covered far more land in Texas, Kansas, and Colorado than it did in Oklahoma.
13
 
Expanding on this earlier analysis with a far more narrow focus, Hurt’s 2000 article 
"Prices, Payments and Production: Kansas Wheat Farmers and the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration,” analyzed the bridge between Midwestern corn farmers 
and southern cotton farmers, the two groups in this comparative study.
14
 Here, Hurt 
examined the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the role the organization 
played in the attempt to restore parity prices to Kansas wheat production. Hurt argued 
that wheat farmers generally appreciated and benefited from the AAA program 
because of their great need brought about by harsh Dust Bowl conditions.
15
 
Hurt’s later work Problems of Plenty (2002) expanded on the discussion in the 
article and revealed one of the major factors that contributed to this positive response 
of farmers in the cotton South toward the controversial legislation at issue.
16
 Hurt 
argued that large-scale overproduction forced these farmers into a position of great 
need and encouraged their compliance with the AAA program.
17
  
                                                 
12
 Ibid., 93. 
 
13
 Ibid., viii. 
 
14
 R. Douglas Hurt, "Prices, Payments and Production: Kansas Wheat Farmers and the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 1933-1939," Kansas History 23 (2000): 72-87. 
 
15
 Ibid., 84. 
 
16
 R. Douglas Hurt, Problems of Plenty: The American Farmer in the Twentieth Century 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002). 
 
17




Though published at the same time, Jean Choate’s Disputed Ground (2002) 
embraced a far more negative interpretation of New Deal programs. Her work 
examined the major opposition groups arrayed against Roosevelt’s agriculture 
policies and featured each organization in its own chapter.
18
 Some of these resistance 
groups include the Farmers Processing Tax Recovery Association and, most relevant 
to this study, the Corn Belt Liberty League.
19
 For this chapter, Choate relied heavily 
on the 1995 journal article by Lynnita Sommer, “Illinois Farmers in Revolt: The Corn 
Belt Liberty League.”
 20
 In her study, Sommer offered a narrative history of the 
participants and methods of the organization in its early form. She explained the 
League’s origins and offered insight into the minds of the founding farmers but 
stopped short of assessing league activities beyond their initial stage.
21
 Choate used 
the article to inform her narrative but expanded on Sommer’s presentation by arguing 
that leaders such as Roosevelt and Wallace recognized the threat posed by these 
political dissenters and actively strove to silence them. Choate’s work contributed to 
the body of literature presenting the negative interpretation of farm policy 
                                                 
18
 Jean Choate, Disputed Ground: Farm Groups that Opposed the (ew Deal Agricultural 
Program (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Co., 2002). 
 
19
 Ibid., 163. 
 
20
 Lynnita Sommer, “Illinois Farmers in Revolt: The Corn Belt Liberty League,” Illinois 







implementation. Additionally, hers is the first and only monograph to date to utilize 
the Ruebush-Goodpasture Corn Belt Liberty League archival collection.
22
  
 In contrast to Choate’s singular focus on negative responses to New Deal 
agriculture programs came Michael Johnston Grant’s 2002 work, Down and Out on 
the Family Farm: Rural Rehabilitation in the Great Plains, 1929-1945.
 23
 In this 
work, which focused exclusively on farmers in Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota, Grant pioneered the case study approach for examining regional 
responses to the policies of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. He went 
beyond Choate’s narrative articulation of New Deal opposition and began to search 
for an underlying ideological foundation that could be used to explain the response of 
plains farmers to the legislation.
24
 He argued that the only “culprit” in the farm 
recovery efforts of the 1930s was the nature of plains farmers, and indeed the nature 
of Americans as a whole, “to favor opportunity over their own security.”
25
 Grant 
pointed out that while many reluctantly accepted federal programs during hard times, 
they also quickly embraced the freedom of the market when prices stabilized.
26
 His 
conclusions about Plains farmers illustrated an ideological difference between them 
and the southern cotton men examined here. While both welcomed assistance during 
difficult times, many in the Cotton Belt, particularly those in Texas, continued to 
                                                 
22
 Ruebush-Goodpasture Collection, Box No. SMS1991-2, Special Collections, Western 
Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois. 
  
23
 Michael Johnston Grant, Down and Out on the Family Farm: Rural Rehabilitation in the 












support federal assistance after the markets began to recover. Their camaraderie and 
belief in their shared fortunes is discussed at length in chapter two. 
Following the publication of Down and Out on the Family Farm, Keith J. 
Volanto also embraced this case study approach to the examination of New Deal farm 
programs and produced Texas, Cotton, and the (ew Deal (2005), which provided one 
of the first AAA studies restricted to a single state.
27
 In it, Volanto argued that Texas 
farmers not only favored compulsory control but specifically requested it after failing 
to see price increases from earlier New Deal Programs.
28
 His valuable source material 
came from the National Archives and from the archival holdings of the Texas 
Agricultural Extension offices. Volanto chronicled national farm policy through the 
eyes of Texas growers beginning with the first Agricultural Adjustment Act and 
continuing through the coming of World War II.
29
 His unique chapter on the plight of 
sharecroppers and tenant farmers under the AAA is especially important because it is 
so rarely found yet so often called for in similar studies. Here, Volanto argued that the 
AAA initiated extreme hardships unique to these landless, small-time farmers and he 
campaigned for further study on their behalf. The monographs of Volanto and Grant 
utilized a case study approach similar to mine but with a few notable exceptions. 
When compared with Volanto’s important contribution, this study is simultaneously 
geographically broader and temporally narrower. Texas, Cotton, and the (ew Deal 
examined one state exclusively and thus lacks the comparative perspective employed 
                                                 
27
 Keith J Volanto, Texas, Cotton, and the (ew Deal (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2005). 
 
28
 Ibid., 58. 
 
29




in my study; however, it analyzed that regional response from the earliest Roosevelt 
farm policy through 1940, a time period far too expansive for a comparative analysis 
in thesis form.
30
 Grant’s work compared farmer response over a similarly lengthy 
period of time but only within one particular region. 
Shortly after the publication of Volanto’s work, Paul K. Conkin produced his 
careful summary Revolution Down on the Farm (2008), which covered important 
changes in American agriculture from 1929 to the present.
31
 Though his study 
extended well beyond the scope of this work, his chapter on New Deal farm 
legislation provided a detailed description of the extraordinarily complicated laws in 
question.
32
 Here, he argued that the 1938 loan program offered farmers a good deal, 
until loan incentives and growing conditions resulted in dramatic surpluses.
33
 Conkin 
shared Hurt’s conviction that the AAA failed to solve the problem of often 




Kurt Lively’s dissertation, “Where the Great Plains and the South Collide: A 
History of Farm Tenancy in Oklahoma, 1890-1950” (2010), offered a new look into 
                                                 
30
 Ibid., 124. 
 
31
 Paul K. Conkin, A Revolution Down on the Farm: The Transformation of American 
Agriculture Since 1929 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008). 
 
32
 Ibid., 74. 
 
33
 Ibid., 75. 
 
34




the life of the largely ignored tenant farmer.
35
 Though his work extends far beyond 
the parameters of the AAA, it provides insight into some of the unique undertakings 
of the Oklahoma legislature at the time. According to Lively, state congressmen 
attempted to mitigate some of the landlord-tenant strife induced by new AAA 
policies.
36
 They even went as far as establishing a landlord-tenant farming department 
and hosted a festival to promote cooperation.
37
 Unlike Lively’s work, the current 
study focuses primarily on the landowning farmer, as only he could participate in the 
AAA referendum process. However, a thorough knowledge of the relationship 
cultivated between renter and owner helps inform this examination and speaks to the 
mindset of the landlord as he traveled to the polls. 
Following a comprehensive examination of the studies on New Deal 
agriculture policy, several gaps appear in the current scholarship. To date, no 
comparative study of public response has been conducted despite the dramatically 
different reactions of farmers that fractured along regional lines. This thesis seeks to 
fill the gap by examining the political, regional, and economic differences present 
between farmers of corn and cotton and by using these motivators to explain their 
opposite reactions. Additionally, recent studies fail to consider geography as a 
contributing factor to voluntary compliance with the 1938 program. This work will 
utilize extensive archival material to provide a new, comparative interpretation of 
responses to the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act. 
                                                 
35
 Kurt Lively, “Where the Great Plains and the South Collide: A History of Farm Tenancy in 
Oklahoma, 1890-1950” (Ph.D. diss., Oklahoma State University, 2010). 
 
36
 Ibid., 247. 
 
37
 Ibid., 248.  
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 The primary sources and archives relevant to this work are numerous in 
quantity and scope. In order to provide a clear outline of each collection and its 
contents, they are organized and discussed topically below. The first group of records 
used to inform this study consists of independent archival collections. University 
libraries in the case study states of Texas, Oklahoma, and Illinois house the majority 
of these collections, such as the Corn Belt Liberty League (CBLL) Ruebush-
Goodpasture archive. An almost untouched resource, the Western Illinois University 
library in Macomb received these files from the granddaughter of a CBLL participant 
only a few years ago. The assortment contains relevant newspaper clippings from 
across the Corn Belt, which proved an invaluable contribution, as many of these 
publications no longer exist and failed to leave records of their early issues.
38
 
Similarly, the Southwest Collection at Texas Tech University holds the records of the 
Lubbock Chamber of Commerce from 1934-45. These and other files, including 
extensive documentation of the Agricultural Adjustment offices in the West Texas 
cotton region make this an important resource for the current study. 
Among the primary source collections necessary for undertaking this study, 
government documents stand out as indispensable. Archives of the Congressional 
Record establish the foundations of the legislation and provide insight into its 
politically charged passage and implementation. The controversial nature of the Act, 
combined with its major impact on the daily life of constituents, resulted in extensive 
speechmaking and discussion in both houses. Congressmen frequently reprinted 
                                                 
38
 Corn Belt Liberty League, Ruebush-Goodpasture Collection, Box No. SMS1991-2, Special 




examples of constituent responses in the Congressional Record Appendix, ranging 
from sharply worded letters, to dramatic radio addresses, to even locally conducted 
polls on the subject of the AAA.
39
 Earlier editions of the Record illuminate the 
meaning of the “parity price levels” so often discussed in the literature and help 
provide context for the state of American farms and agriculture policy prior to the 
New Deal.  
Additional government documents relevant to the AAA include the National 
Archives records of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and the records of 
the office of the Secretary of Agriculture. These holdings are then further grouped by 
agencies that made up the administration, including the Surplus Marketing 
Administration, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, and so on. The records 
provide a broad based national view of the legislation and help illuminate the 
challenges Wallace faced as he worked to convince and then monitor every farmer in 
the nation for compliance with the farm bill.
40
 For a more localized picture, the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration established regional offices to aid in the 
distribution of loan payments, to spread the message of participation benefits, and to 
generally act as liaisons between the individual farmers and the national organization. 
The majority of these state and county offices either kept their own archival 
collections or stored their documentation with state extension offices. These 
collections, particularly the archive at the Texas A&M extension office, further 
                                                 
39
 Speech by Rep. Andreson, Appendix, Cong. Rec., 75th Cong., 3rd sess., 1938, 83, pt. 1737. 
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inform the study on the successes and failures of executing the legislation at a local 
level. 
Magazine and newspaper archives make up the bulk of primary sources relied 
upon by this study. Of these, the American Liberty Magazine constitutes the most 
directly relevant and informative collection. From 1938 to 1941, the Corn Belt 
Liberty League published this newsletter to spread the message of their opposition to 
the production control methods of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. 
Contributions to the paper came from farmers, wives, congressmen, and local leaders 
all anxious to undermine the new farm bill. In its early months, the magazine focused 
exclusively on this mission with an occasional two inch block reserved for weather 
announcements or prizewinning recipes. As the readership expanded to include 
CBLL chapters in new states, the scope of the magazine broadened slightly and one 
of the later issues even contained an article suggesting an early form of the gasoline 
additive ethanol to resolve the corn surplus problem.
41
 The archive contains 
unmatched insight into the heart of the anti-AAA movement.
42
 
In addition to topical magazines, newspapers constitute another important 
collection of primary sources covering the farmers’ response to the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act. For the Corn Belt case study, which examines farmers in Illinois, the 
Chicago Tribune archives prove particularly illuminating. This major paper published 
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extensively on the 1938 Act and focused on the localized corn farmer revolt. The 
issue so heavily impacted the Tribune’s regional readership, that the paper also sent 
agricultural correspondents to major southern farming regions. They assigned these 
reporters to satisfy their high reader demand for information regarding competitive 
corn planting in the South. If they hoped to find reassurance for their struggling 
cultivators they quickly learned the bad news. Cotton farmers in the South indeed 
supplemented their limited acreage with homegrown corn.
43
 The Chicago Tribune’s 
coverage of this and other AAA related issues earned national recognition and even 
prompted multiple debates on the House floor in Washington.  
Providing balance to the often regional focus of the Chicago Tribune, the (ew 
York Times and Christian Science Monitor reveal broad-based national attitudes about 
the legislation. They are perhaps most helpful for their careful reproduction of 
referendum results. These important statistics illustrate, quantitatively, the response of 
farmers to the AAA. Without such a numeric representation, establishing the picture 
of regional opinion would be substantially more difficult. In addition to poll numbers, 
these two publications also report heavily on the actions of the major government 
players involved, particularly Wallace and Wickard. Stories of their plans to 
encourage farmer compliance and monitor implementation clarify the government 
position and inform the study with national sentiment.  
Numerous smaller, local papers offer insight into the hometown reactions of 
farmers both for and against this legislation. Some of these include the Lubbock 
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Avalanche Journal, the Daily Journal (Macomb, IL), the Bureau County Republican 
(Princeton, IL), the San Antonio Express, the Denton Record Chronicle (Denton, TX), 
and the Daily Oklahoman, just to name a few. Like so many smaller, local papers in 
farming towns in the 1930s, these served as sounding boards for public opinion 
toward the AAA. These publications contain numerous letters to the editor, guest 
columns, and general articles that relate the mood of local farmers during the 
implementation of the controversial New Deal legislation.  
This work primarily examines American farmers through the lenses of social, 
political, and economic history. In order to develop a clear picture of the attitudes and 
ideologies of the men and women involved, the study employs a comparative, case 
study approach to establish that corn and cotton farmers in varying regions responded 
differently to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and to determine the cause of 
their disparate reactions. This qualitative case study utilizes a range of sources and 
quantitative analysis to establish the general currents of opinion within a particular 
region. The thesis draws the most important quantitative data from the yearly 
referendum required by the legislation at issue and supplements it with responses to 
nationwide polls.  
 This approach will provide new insight on the implementation of such highly 
controversial legislation and help to explain the dramatic responses from individual 
farmers. After extensive research, this study contends that, whereas Corn Belt 
growers suffered from overproduction to a degree, the versatility of their crop and its 
utility as a food item for both family and hog operations enabled them to turn a profit, 
however meager, without the aid of the AAA. Southern cotton, on the contrary, faced 
20 
 
insurmountable surpluses on a worldwide scale and struggled against increasingly 
difficult crop exportation because of the Smoot-Hawley tariff. In addition to their 
distinctive economic situations, corn and cotton farmers possessed powerful political 
differences, evident through the former passionately decrying the “communist” nature 
of the new law and the latter anxious to share responsibility for their communal 
fortunes.  
Both economic and ideological divergence caused corn and cotton farmers to 
respond to the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act in opposite ways. While some 
growers enjoyed the flexibility and incentive to chance the market, others clung to 
national production controls to maintain a subsistence living. With over 3,500,000 
American farmers currently affected by federal crop legislation, a proper analysis of 
the origins of agriculture policy helps to further illuminate current practices and the 






A Thankful Texas 
 
When South Carolina Senator James H. Hammond declared in 1858 that 
“Cotton is King,” his assertion was already accepted—and lamented—in the North, 
and axiomatic in the South. 1 After displacing tobacco, cotton, more than any other 
crop, defined agriculture in the American South from the late 1700s until the mid 
1900s. This held particularly true for Texas, the state responsible for producing over 
one third of the nation’s cotton during the 1930s.2 While portions of East Texas had 
always been well-suited to the production of the crop, in his 1977 article, “The 
Demise of King Cotton,” John Fraser Hart explained that by the end of 1929, cotton 
had spread from its traditional location in the Texas Blackland Prairie westward into 
the High Plains due to increases in irrigation technology.3 While many other states 
took acreage out of cotton production beginning as early as 1910, Texas continued to 
increase cultivation of the crop until 1935 or later in some counties.4 Despite their 
insistence on maintaining decision-making authority over their own operations during 
the Civil War, the difficulties of the 1930s challenged growers in ways previously 
unimagined. It was with a certain irony, then, that the region that went to war against 
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the federal government to defend its cotton- (and slave-) based economy later turned 
to that same authority for its preservation. 
When cotton growers suffered alongside other farmers during the Great 
Depression, the Roosevelt administration promoted farm legislation designed to 
stabilize crop prices. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA) became the 
most enduring legal measure to result from these attempts but faced opposition from 
cultivators of every major crop it regulated. Some participated as members of 
grassroots organizations like the Corn Belt Liberty League, to be discussed in detail 
in chapter four.5 Others, such as J. A. Troopy, chose to pursue personal lawsuits 
against enforcement of the legislation.6 Despite this opposition, Texas cotton farmers 
voted overwhelmingly in favor of not only submitting to the Act, but imposing on 
themselves its harshest restrictions in the form of marketing quotas. Unlike 
Midwestern corn farmers who could still make a meager living from their crop or, at 
the very least, convert it to feed for hog-raising, Texas cotton men could not afford to 
oppose this farm bill. Contrary to their historic resistance to federal intervention they 
opted to depend on the mandatory marketing controls of the AAA. Their support for 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 stemmed from the economic distress of 
massive overproduction, a problem exacerbated by unusually excellent growing 
conditions and the loss of foreign markets.  
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Origins of the 1938 Legislation 
Federal cotton programs began in 1929 with President Herbert Hoover’s plan 
to raise the price of cotton above eighteen cents per pound. Ironically, following the 
implementation of his program, cotton would fall to the unthinkably low price of five 
cents per pound and would not reach eight cents until the late 1930s despite the best 
efforts of New Deal regulators.7 The original Agricultural Adjustment Act appeared 
in 1933.8 It attempted to stabilize prices by imposing a new tax on agricultural 
processing and distributing the revenue as a subsidy to those who agreed to reduce 
production. Regulators thought that by controlling crop output they could return to 
“parity prices,” referring to those very favorable prices experienced from 1909-14.9 
The law contained only one compulsory provision, a universal tax, levied against 
processors such as ginners, millers, and slaughterhouses. Such uniformity protected 
this first program from nationwide public disapproval. However, in United States v. 
Butler (1936), an Ohio cotton man challenged the constitutionality of the program 
and found the Supreme Court sympathetic to his cause.10 They held that although 
Congress possessed the constitutional authority to levy taxes and could spend to 
promote general welfare, they were exceeding these powers by effectively regulating 
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agriculture, which they had no constitutional power to do.11 Along with several other 
Roosevelt initiatives, the justices found this regulation to violate the Tenth 
Amendment to the constitution, which reserves unspecified powers—including 
regulatory powers in the Court’s analysis—to the states.12 
When the 1933 law was overturned, New Deal leaders sought an alternative 
tailored to withstand similar scrutiny. Congress had failed to accomplish this goal by 
fall 1937 so the president called them into a special session for the express purpose of 
promulgating his second plan. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 satisfied his 
requirements. As he signed the bill on February 16, 1938, Roosevelt called it “historic 
legislation” and “the winning of one more battle for an underlying farm policy that 
will endure.”13 The second portion of his assessment indicated his view that this 
program remained faithful to the objectives of the 1933 regulation. The new AAA 
maintained the goal of increased prices through reduced production but removed the 
processing tax provision declared unconstitutional in US v. Butler. Unlike its 
predecessor, the 1938 Act contained two methods for production control of major 
crops including cotton, corn, rice, tobacco, and wheat.  
A voluntary allotment system was the default method under which farmers 
received an individual acreage allowance each year. Cooperation with these 
allotments earned participants federal loans and grant money to offset their losses in 
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production.14 A violation carried the indirect burden of losing funding eligibility, but 
the farmer faced no legal penalty for his excess planting. The second control 
mechanism, mandatory marketing quotas, went into effect if the Secretary of 
Agriculture estimated that annual production of a particular crop would exceed 115% 
of predicted consumption. When enacted, each farmer received a cap on the amount 
of crop he could sell. For cotton, the quota equaled either the actual or the average 
yield, whichever was greater, from an allotted acreage in addition to any carryover 
the farmer possessed from the previous year.15 If a grower exceeded his marketing 
quota, he incurred a fine of two cents per excess pound sold for the first year and 
three cents per pound each subsequent year. 
To measure support and likely compliance, the second program required a 
complex referendum by secret ballot in which every affected cultivator was eligible to 
vote. Under the referendum provision, mandatory marketing quotas required a two-
thirds supermajority to be enacted. As an incentive to pass the quotas, any crop sector 
failing to pass the plan would be cut off from all loans until the second growing year 
following the vote.16 
“We mean control with teeth in it!” 
The new act emerged just as the Bureau of Crop Estimates and the Ginner’s 
Report revealed disquieting news about the 1937 cotton crop. Early reports had 
indicated the cotton crop would not exceed the 1936 yield by even ten percent, but the 
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Bureau revised this estimate sharply upward. In Texas an acre of cotton typically 
yielded one third of a bale, but for the 1937 crop each acre yielded closer to half a 
bale.17 Excellent growing conditions had resulted in a yield in excess of 18,000,000 
bales where less than 14,000,000 had been expected. Planters now feared prices 
might fall even lower than those seen at the beginning of the decade.18  Following the 
signing of the law, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration responded with 
marketing quotas on both cotton and fire and flue-cured tobacco.  
This establishment of quotas triggered the referendum requirement of the Act 
and AAA officials began to campaign in favor of the measure. Confusion among 
farmers about the new law proved to be a tall hurdle for quota advocates. Throughout 
the decade, farmers had operated under at least three separate control plans while 
Congress debated and experimented with various agriculture proposals. The new plan 
combined Secretary Wallace’s “Ever Normal Grainery”19 theory of saving crops 
during good seasons and selling during bad seasons with the Farm Bureau’s 
insistence on production controls.20 Not surprisingly, growers initially struggled to 
understand these theories as policy and reacted with resentment toward farming 
instructions from Washington.21 Officials first responded to their concerns by trying 
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to make the legislation easier to understand and using radio stations in affected areas 
to broadcast speeches on the subject. One such speech came from Senator Ellison 
Smith of South Carolina. Smith began by reminding his listeners of the terrible 
overproduction of 1937, knowing they were struggling to sell off the massive 
excesses.22 He also pointed out the distinctive plight of the cotton farmers by 
explaining that domestic consumption of other crops was near 100% while cotton 
farmers could sell less than 50% of their crop within the United States. Smith 
acknowledged that the Smoot-Hawley tariff deserved much blame for the loss of 
international markets, but used this problem to encourage his constituents to vote in 
favor of quotas as the only relief offered at the time.23 The heart of Smith’s speech 
centered on the meetings he conducted among the farmers in his state before voting 
for the act. He quoted the farmers who cried “give us control—and when we say 
control we mean control with teeth in it!”24 This statement insisted that quotas came 
at the request of the farmers and encouraged them to carry that attitude to the polls 
two weeks later. In addition to speeches given by congressmen and administrators, 
Wallace issued statements reminding voters that if they decided against quotas, he 
would be powerless to help them and all aid would be cut off.25 As the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration opened offices and farmers elected local Administration 
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officials, informational meetings were held to explain and advocate the quota system 
in hopes of a favorable vote in mid-March.26 
On March 12, 1938, weeks after FDR signed the legislation, cotton and 
tobacco farmers participated in referenda, pledging overwhelming support for the 
quota plan.27 Agricultural Adjustment Administrator H. R. Tolley celebrated the high 
voter turnout and the decision to adopt the quota system, while expressing surprise at 
the positive returns from the Lone Star State. Officials feared opposition from the 
nation’s largest cotton producer, which often exported a higher percentage of its 
cotton than did its neighbors, but found Texans voted 88% in favor of quotas. Though 
many Texans favored alternative programs that could benefit them more directly, they 
could not resist when the quota program came to a vote.28 Many states had even 
higher percentages, such as Arkansas and Mississippi both with 97% percent in 
favor.29 One explanation for the higher percentages in the Eastern South might be 
found in Hart’s discussion of acreage trends in the early 1900s. While the cotton 
acreage in most Eastern South states peaked around 1910 and steadily declined from 
there, acreage in the Western South, particularly in Texas, did not peak until 1935 or 
later.30 Thus, while many in Mississippi, Alabama, and surrounding areas were 
already in the process of reducing acreage by 1938, some West Texas farmers had 
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just begun to enter the trade and were not ready to remove their newly broken ground 
from cultivation. 
The ational Response 
On the day of the referendum, individual acreage allotments had not yet been 
established. Farmers knew only the national acreage figure of 26,500,000, enough 
land to produce approximately 11,000,000 bales of cotton.31 This figure paled in 
comparison to the almost 19,000,000 bale bumper crop produced in 1937 and 
amounted to a reduction of approximately 42%.  
When allotments were finally distributed, farmers balked at the low rates and 
many with small plots declared they would be unable to earn even a meager 
subsistence on their acreage allowance. According to a speech delivered by 
Representative August Andresen in May 1938, “Complaints by the thousands poured 
into Washington… Cotton-planting time was at hand, and the small cotton farmer 
demanded additional acreage from Secretary Wallace.”32 Ultimately these men gained 
some small measure of relief when eighteen amendments to the law passed, 
increasing allotments by four percent.33 
Many farmers took this opportunity to begin experimenting with 
diversification. Corn Belt farmers feared new southern corn so much that the Chicago 
Tribune sent their agricultural correspondent, Frank Ridgeway, south to investigate. 
Ridgeway confirmed their fears when he wrote “The whole crop map of the Cotton 
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Belt is undergoing a critical revision… On down the Mississippi river corn is ankle 
high in the Memphis region, and here in the Clarksdale neighborhood a few fields 
will soon be shooting ears.”34 
As the AAA continued to encounter obstacles, many former supporters began 
to fall away. Tobacco farmers, having passed quotas overwhelmingly in March, voted 
to rid themselves of the restrictions only nine months later.35 Rice growers faced their 
own referendum in December and also declined to pass quotas.36 Senator William 
Borah of Idaho called these defeats the “death knell” for the act’s underlying theories, 
saying: “The idea of production control is dead.”37 When tobacco and rice farmers 
voted against the marketing quota plan, they were not merely expressing 
dissatisfaction with excessive regulation. The negative vote barred all farmers in these 
two crop divisions from receiving federal loans for an entire year. Those in tobacco 
who voted against the program took a serious economic gamble and forfeited the 
money that was available only when quotas were approved. This response represented 
for some an impassioned rejection of federal intervention and for others a considered 
economic assessment that control of their own output was probably worth more than 
the federally guaranteed loans they would temporarily lose.38 As Robert Snyder 
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demonstrated in his 1984 Cotton Crisis, no other crop experienced the levels of 
hardship endured by cotton in the 1930s.39 Their degree of overproduction crippled 
any chance of restoring prices to parity levels. After the winter of 1938-39, cotton 
was the only crop still under federal marketing quotas, but while they continued to 
support the AAA at the polls, many Texas farmers began calling for a shift to an 
alternative plan, such as Domestic Allotment, which guaranteed them a fixed price for 
the portion of their crop sold within the United States. Advocates of this plan differed 
as to what form the assistance should take, but most favored a type of subsidy 
payment whereby the government purchased the domestically consumed percentage 
of a crop from the farmer with funding obtained through a processing tax placed on 
ginners and millers.40 Secretary Wallace refused to entertain this concept for any 
period of time, and when asked about such a system while holding a forum in Fort 
Worth, Texas, Wallace replied hotly that Domestic Allotment was a “road to 
disaster!”41 His flat rejection of the plan preferred by so many in the region led Texas 
Commissioner of Agriculture J. E. McDonald to respond accusingly "The officials of 
[Wallace's] organization are merely holding their AAA jobs to keep from leaning on 
WPA shovels."42 McDonald viewed Wallace’s plan as the enemy of American 
agriculture and carefully monitored the administration for any sign that they might be 
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open to a program more in line with the wishes of his small-time farmers.43 In 
November of 1938, McDonald released a prepared statement to the editors of 
American Liberty Magazine, a publication of the Corn Belt Liberty League, stating 
“President Roosevelt is looking with favor upon Domestic Allotment Plan for 
agriculture and this is the most encouraging news to everyone sincerely interested in 
the welfare of agriculture… [He] has been too long misled by the impractical ideas of 
Henry A. Wallace… who in the past five years thoroughly demonstrated his inability 
to stabilize American agriculture.”44 McDonald and his fellow proponents of 
Domestic Allotment campaigned hard against the passage of the December 
referendum to continue marketing quotas on cotton for the 1939 growing year. He 
called for an outright rejection of the program and attempted to inflame readers when 
he wrote, “Five years is long enough to tolerate impractical ideas and plans and the 
cotton farmers of the South should vote down the cotton referendum scheduled for 
December 10.”45 
The decision of the southern cotton farmer to continue participating in the 
AAA illustrates the truly dire economic situation he faced. Secretary Wallace 
encouraged this desperation prior to the referendum by insisting farmers would pass 
the measure “if you want to save your economic life.”46 Despite the 1938 cotton 
reduction of 42% percent, the crop surplus still reached an all-time record high. 
                                                 











Worldwide cotton had produced a 50,000,000 bale carryover, meaning even if the 
entire globe immediately ceased all cotton production, there would be enough in 
storage to satisfy world demand for two years.47 Alabama Senator John Bankhead 
called the “yes” vote: “the only thing to do when you have got the biggest surplus in 
world history.”48  
Several factors contributed to the large surplus, but the main causes included 
the loss of international markets and the unusually excellent growing conditions in the 
late 1930s. In 1937, just prior to the passage of the new AAA, Agricultural 
Adjustment Administrator H. R. Tolley published a defense of the plan to aid farmers.  
In his analysis, he outlined startling figures regarding the world cotton trade. Tolley 
explained that in the 1927-29 growing years, American cotton made up 46% of all 
cotton purchased worldwide. By the 1935-36 season, the USA’s market share had 
shrunk to 32%. In 1937, American cotton accounted for only 24% of the world 
market.49 Over this period, Tolley noted, foreign prices were consistently 20% below 
that of US-grown cotton. This loss of market-share with no substantial change in 
price structure was noted by other academics as well. James E. Boyle, professor of 
Rural Economy at Cornell University, wrote in August 1937 that America’s place in 
the international cotton markets did not falter until 1929, when President Hoover first 
attempted to raise cotton prices above the market price (eighteen cents per pound). 
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Boyle argued that Hoover’s promise of sky-high prices immediately prompted foreign 
countries like Brazil to enter the trade and encouraged those already in production, 
such as Egypt, to dramatically increase output.50 
The following year brought the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which Boyle cited as 
further cause for America’s international losses. He affirmed that the “tariff made it 
impossible for some old customers to buy our cotton at all. Sales to Germany, France, 
England, and Japan showed immediate and drastic slumps. We kept the cotton at 
home and called it a surplus.”51 Boyle went on to list problems associated with the 
first two attempts of the AAA toward managed production but focused chiefly on the 
problem of the tariff.  
Congressional leaders like Representative George Mahon of Texas agreed: 
“Mere reduction in the production of American cotton by marketing quotas or 
otherwise will not adequately raise the price of cotton in view of enormous 
production abroad.”52 Thus when cotton producers voted to install quotas they were 
not exercising a vote of confidence in the theory of higher prices through artificial 
domestic scarcity, but were voting for all immediately available financial assistance 
that they could not live without.53 They were willing to try output control if it might 
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make a difference, and could not afford to lose federal loan opportunities. As cotton 
farmer G. M. Boyd wrote to Senator Elmer Thomas, “I am by this farm question as 
the man was by his wife, said he could hardly live with her and could not live without 
her at all.”54 They lived in fear of the possible financial penalties; according to 
Representative Andresen, “they were told by government agents that if they did not 
vote for compulsory control, they would not receive their 1937 adjustment 
payments… amounting to $130,000,000.00.”55 An opinion poll appearing in the 
Christian Science Monitor in late 1939 indicated farmers believed they could achieve 
better financial results by complying with restrictions and accepting benefit payments 
than by maximizing selling. Farmers in the same poll expressed frustration that 
despite plowing up cotton from 1937 and reducing seeded acres in 1938 they still had 
not seen an increase in prices.56 
Despite many farmers’ best attempts at reducing production, they faced a 
surprising number of natural obstacles. All records indicate an outstanding growing 
season in 1937; this high yield proved problematic not only for the 1937 marketing 
year but also for subsequent years because any crop not sold in a current marketing 
year was stored as carryover and simply crowded the market the following year.57 
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Additionally, some compliant farmers became accidental non-cooperators as cotton 
sprouted in their fallow fields independent of their planting efforts.   
In their time of great crisis, Texas cotton farmers turned to government 
leaders for assistance they desperately required. This need resulted from excessive 
production, both foreign and domestic, and from America’s loss of international 
market-share in the cotton growing industry. Unlike most other crops regulated by the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, cotton could not survive without the 
intervention promised by the act. In contrast to growers of staple crops they could not 
eat their surpluses, nor was the overproduction problem as persistent for food crops as 
it was for King Cotton. While cotton lacked these advantages in the free market, the 
other crop families each had perceived disadvantages under, or grievances toward, 
federal supervision—notably, competition from southerners diversifying into food 
crops because they lived outside the regions affected by those quotas. 
For all these reasons, cotton farmers alone voted for and maintained stringent 
mandatory controls rather than abandon the crop they knew. Other growers, while 
still suffering under the poor economy, possessed both the flexibility and the 
incentives to chance the market. This confluence of events fundamentally changed the 
relationship between cotton producers and federal power in a manner that has 
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Oklahoma cotton farmers did not enjoy a happy relationship with New Deal 
farm legislation. In fact, they rejected the 1934 Bankhead Cotton Control Act out of 
hand because it put them, along with their colleagues in Texas and North Carolina, at 
a particular disadvantage.
1
 As agriculture policy evolved throughout the 1930s, 
however, they found themselves willing to entertain a variety of plans in hopes of 
escaping precarious economic circumstances. When the 1938 Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA) appeared, it lacked many of their preferred features and 
provided, as they understood it, far less economic benefit than the Domestic 
Allotment Plan they would have chosen, but they proceeded with cautious optimism 
in the beginning. In their extreme economic distress, Oklahoma cotton farmers 
supported the AAA with tempered enthusiasm but soon turned against the legislation 
after receiving allotments too small to provide a subsistence income.  
Throughout the New Deal, Sooner State growers worked to understand and 
benefit from the various programs offered by the federal government but also took an 
active role in attempting to influence federal farm policy. Their attempts swelled in 
1937 as Congress debated yet another plan to restore “parity prices” and economic 
prosperity to the nation’s agriculturalists. Traces of their efforts emerge everywhere 
from local newspaper articles to personal letters in congressional archives, and the 
relief they sought varied widely with each request. Many Oklahomans pushed for a 
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Domestic Allotment Plan, the favorite policy of Oklahoma senator Josh Lee.
2
 Under 
this plan, farmers received guaranteed higher prices for a percentage of their cotton 
based on the estimated rate of domestic consumption. Proponents established the 
guaranteed amount by estimating the percentage of the crop consumed within the 
United States in the preceding years. This concept proved particularly attractive to 
Oklahoma farmers because it included no compulsory production controls. Instead, 
designers of this system hoped that low prices for the cotton sold in excess of the 
domestic allotment would dissuade farmers from overplanting.
 3
 
The complex nature of the AAA compromise and the speed with which it 
became law caused a great deal of confusion among growers.
4
 Many wrote to their 
senators and representatives soliciting copies of the legislation, but even when they 




As they had in Texas, Agricultural Adjustment Administrators set up new 
county offices and encouraged farmers to elect local officials to lead the program in 
their area. They distributed information to explain and advocate the quota system, 
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always encouraging a positive vote.
6
 On March 12, 1938, Oklahomans participated in 
the nationwide referendum on marketing quotas.
7
 Like their neighbors in nearby 
states, Oklahoma farmers approved the plan but did so with the least favorable returns 
of any state involved. Among Sooner State farmers, only 70% voted to invoke the 
quota provision, meaning a full 30% were willing to sacrifice precious loan payments 
and take their chance on the open and unrestricted market. While these numbers 
appear to be a favorable reaction, they barely reach the supermajority threshold 
required by the legislation and they pale in comparison to every other cotton state. 
Louisiana favored the plan by 98% and both Arkansas and Mississippi returned 97% 
positive responses. Tobacco quotas also passed with enthusiasm generally exceeding 
the response observed in Oklahoma.
8
 
On the day of the referendum, Sooner State farmers were also unaware of 
their individual acreage allotments. They understood that a national allowance of 
11,000,000 bales of cotton nearly cut the previous year’s production in half but were 
reassured by legislators who claimed they would not face individual cuts deeper than 
twenty percent.
9
 When allotments were finally distributed, Oklahoma cotton men 
could hardly believe the reductions they experienced and immediately reached out to 
Senators Josh Lee and Elmer Thomas. Senator Lee advocated for many of the early 
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Despite small increases in acreage, cotton farmers continued to protest the 
plan’s implementation and bombarded their congressmen with letters and telegrams 
expressing their displeasure. On May 4, Senator Bailey of North Carolina presented a 
long and impassioned appeal on behalf of farmers across the Cotton Belt. He decried 
the remarkably small allotments received by small-time farmers and lamented the 
lateness of the season as growers knew their window of planting opportunity had 
passed.
11
 When Senator Vandenberg of Michigan inquired as to how many North 
Carolina farmers voted in favor of the quota system, Bailey acknowledged that his 
state approved the legislation by almost 90% but he went on to explain that since 
receiving their quotas, many had changed their minds. He offered statements from 
constituent letters claiming “we did not understand it… there was 
misrepresentation… we were persuaded to vote for this with assurances, none of 
which are being made good.”
12
 
Oklahoma Senator Josh Lee noticed another problem with allotments in the 
early stages of distribution and delivered a speech in May revealing that many 
farmers planted their fields well before allotments arrived. Unlike the Texas farmers 
who often overplanted their cotton, some of Lee’s constituents anticipated 
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exceptionally small allotments and embraced the opportunity to diversify into 
alternate crops such as wheat. A substantial portion of their Oklahoma neighbors 
were already engaged in the production of grain so the crop was more familiar to 
them than to their Texas counterparts. The resulting acreage distribution problem was 
symptomatic of one of the biggest oversights of the legislation: the failure to 
anticipate farmers using diversification as a means of escaping crop control. Many 
farmers therefore received cotton allotments for acreage already taken up by wheat. 
The law made no allowance for such acreage to be reassigned, so it became known as 
“frozen acreage”—legally accounted for, but not producing the restricted crop.
13
 
According to Lee, 330,000 acres or between fifteen and twenty percent of 
Oklahoma’s allotment consisted of “frozen acres.”
14
 Following Lee’s vigorous 
campaign, frozen acreage was released to be redistributed within the state ensuring 
that border states, whose farmers often alternated between cotton and wheat, could 
enjoy their full statewide allotment. 
Even with acreage finally unfrozen, Oklahomans exhibited an about-face 
similar to that seen in North Carolina but focused particularly on the divisions 
between large-scale and “dirt farmers” in their complaints about the legislation. Many 
who identified themselves with the latter begged their government to make particular 
allowances for their endangered subsistence operations.
15
 Senator Thomas grew so 
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concerned over the AAA’s effects on small-time farmers that he decided to hold a 
series of meetings around his state in the fall of 1938 to provide a forum for 
discussing the future of the legislation. To ensure maximum attendance at these 
meetings and to make provisions for those unable to travel, Thomas sent out letters to 
each of his constituents with information about the meetings and attached surveys 
polling farmers as to their opinion of the current law.
16
  
As Thomas entered Claremore for his first meeting on October 24, 1938, 
former Governor and then gubernatorial candidate William H. Murray launched a 
series of pre-election radio addresses designed to stir the public against the senator 
and emphasize the split between the corporate and the family farmers.
17
 In his speech, 
Murray reminded listeners of current economic hardships and appealed to their fears 
of increasing government intervention like those embodied in George W. 
Thompson’s letter to Elmer Thomas. Here the farmer stated, “[The AAA] is 
Stalinism, Hitlerism, and also Walliceism [sic] right here in America and that kind of 
talk would lead to a firing squad most any place but here because it is also treasonable 
talk.”
18
 Murray’s language also bore striking similarities to that used across the upper 
Midwest by members of the Corn Belt Liberty League in their fight to undermine 
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New Deal farm legislation.
19
 The League emphasized themes of government 
oppression and even hired disaffected Russian farming instructor John E. Waters who 
warned “Already you farmers are being subjected to a form of policing, to fines and 
penalties if you do not do as you are told. You have spies, detectives, and sleuths 
watching you.”
20
 Murray’s admonition of the AAA as a harbinger of totalitarian 
communist government bent on “destroy[ing] all the little farmers” proved typical of 
the anti-New Deal rhetoric at the time.
21
 
Though his October meetings attracted mostly large-scale farmers with the 
means to travel, the “dirt farmer” perspective overwhelmingly filled the replies to 
Thomas’s letter and survey. At the October 25 meeting in Enid, Lyle L. Hague, a 
farmer from Cherokee and director of the Farmers’ National Grain Corporation, gave 
a speech in which he stated “the majority of the men I have contacted… believe that 
any lasting Agricultural legislation must be based upon acreage or production 
control.”
22
 Hague argued that most farmers in the state had no problem with the 
legislation itself and would be mollified if they could be guaranteed a form of 
domestic allotment pricing.
23
 Others remained unconvinced. J. A. Julien, president of 
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the Julien & Co. Investment Service in Chickasha and chief supervisor of 285 
Oklahoma farms wrote to Thomas to assure him that the meeting held at Pauls Valley 
failed to accurately represent the concerns of the family farmer.
24
 Regarding the 
survey question on acreage allotments, Julien remarked “I got one impression 
definitely as to #8 was that the majority were like Coolidge’s preacher about sin; he 
was ‘agin it.’”
25
 Julien insisted that if Thomas met with farmers in southeastern 
Oklahoma or with his farm supervisor in Durant, the senator would have heard 
opinions quite opposite from those expressed by Hague.
26
  
The conflicting opinions of Hague and Julien could indicate a larger 
divergence between Oklahoma farmers growing wheat and those focused chiefly on 
cotton. Hague’s geographic location in the northwestern portion of the state and his 
position with the National Grain Corp. certainly identify him with his fellow wheat 
farmers whereas Julien’s interests in the southern region suggest a greater exposure to 
the plight of those in cotton. Stacks of handwritten letters indicate Julien is not far off 
in his estimation of the local response. Notes from towns such as Geronimo and Altus 
expressed extreme displeasure with the production control system and called for 
transition to a domestic allotment style plan.
27
 A farmer from Kingfisher even took it 
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upon himself to petition the senator on behalf of others struggling in his county. He 
kept a careful record of his interactions with the County Agent, Mr. Mueggenborg, 
and noted discrepancies and violations of the established policies including acreage 
reductions placed on farms that were small enough to qualify for an exemption.
28
  
In addition to the epistolary feedback, Thomas took careful note of his 
completed survey cards, answering each submission whether it accompanied a letter 
or arrived alone in postcard form. The majority of survey responses that remain 
express an overwhelming inclination toward Domestic Allotment and repeal or 
significant modification of the current farm bill, particularly the acreage allotment 
portion.
29
 The deviation could stem from the constituents’ understanding of the 
surveys, which accompanied the meeting invitation, as an alternative to attendance in 
case one could not afford to travel. Thus wealthier farmers at the meetings clamored 
for a continuation of the act and increasingly restrictive production control while 
those who responded in writing preferred the opposite. Regardless of the 
recommendations in the feedback he received, Thomas’s meetings successfully 
accomplished the underlying political goal. The senator clearly understood the 
incredibly divisive nature of the act and its potential impact on his reelection 
campaign. In addition to warnings heard in radio addresses such as Murray’s, Thomas 
received letters from local supporters stating outright “I do not think any democrat 
[sic] can carry this county as long as we have the present allotment board. The 
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Department of Agriculture has lost the New Deal more votes than any other half a 
dozen things.”
30
 Thomas needed a way to distance himself politically from the farm 
bill, and his statewide survey and agriculture hearings provided him exactly that 
opportunity.  
Though dissatisfaction with acreage allowances came from multiple regions, 
Texans to some extent and Oklahomans in particular protested their distribution with 
unique zeal. In a debate on the senate floor, Alabama Senator Bankhead expressed a 
lack of familiarity and even disbelief regarding complaints against acreage 
restrictions. In defense of the legislation he claimed “I doubt if I have received 50 
complaints with respect to the farm law since its passage, whereas previously I 
received thousands.”
31
 Both Connally of Texas and Lee of Oklahoma quickly 
responded to this claim and made clear that their own constituents were quite 
dissatisfied, whatever the position of Alabama cotton farmers.  
When interpreted within the context of average cotton yield per acre, these 
divergent responses certainly appear reasonable and perhaps even predictable. From 
1870 onward, both Oklahoma and Texas experienced significant drops in average lint 
yield per acre, reducing their yields from roughly on par with the rest of the country, 
to well below average. This failure ultimately landed Oklahoma in last place among 
cotton growing states at the time. The chart below illustrates the sharp contrast in 
productivity between Lee’s farmers and Bankhead’s.       
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In practical terms, an Oklahoma cotton farmer would need to plant roughly 
8.5 acres in order to produce one bale of cotton while a North Carolina farmer would 
only need 1.6 acres to achieve the same result.
Clayton & Co., a cotton merchant native to Oklahoma City, recognized this disparity 
and conducted research on the subject of improving cotton quality and productivity in 
the region. Their study revealed that states in the southeast reco
decline in its early stages and implemented statewide improvement programs 
designed to increase both lint per acre (quantity) and the length of the fiber itself 
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their cotton production into new counties at the time, they did not undertake similar 
efforts. Oklahoma, in particular, fell behind in each quality measure so much so that 
some cotton merchants actually prohibited the delivery of Oklahoma cotton in 
fulfillment of their contracts.
34
 This disadvantage provides yet another reason as to 
why Oklahomans preferred Domestic Allotment. When they experienced difficulty 
getting their cotton into the domestic market, any plan whereby they were guaranteed 
the higher US price for their product would certainly have seemed attractive, 
particularly when it included no compulsory production limitations and allowed 
farmers to produce and sell as much cheap cotton as they wished beyond their base 
allotment. Unfortunately for Sooner state farmers, this plan made little headway in 
Washington. Wallace personally hated the Domestic Allotment plan, as he 
demonstrated at his forum in Fort Worth, Texas, discussed in the previous chapter.
 35
  
Wallace did oppose outright price fixing, particularly when performed on the 
basis of the farmers’ cost of production but favored the idea of helping growers 
bridge the gap between market and parity prices with the assistance of commodity 
loans.
36
 These loan provisions already existed under the 1938 act but there was some 
dispute regarding how to best fund the program. While in Fort Worth, Wallace made 
the shocking suggestion that Congress reinstate the processing tax recently declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. "Why not use this kind of a tax once more? 
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We know it will work because it has worked."
37
 Of course, Wallace’s call to return to 
the days of processing taxes proved in vain. He could not legally revive the tax as he 
knew very well from the earlier Supreme Court decisions.  
As the end of the year approached, the time came for cotton farmers to return 
to the polls and reexamine the compulsory quota system. In preparation for this vote, 
the Department of Agriculture once again dispatched speakers to campaign in favor 
of the measure. The most heavily emphasized provision reminded voters that their 
failure to pass quotas would immediately terminate all crop loans for the upcoming 
year.
38
 The somewhat revised quota system included a fifty percent increase in the 
overage penalty from two cents per pound to three cents per pound in an effort to 




When they saw no alternative, Oklahoma cotton farmers turned to the AAA 
for assistance they craved. Despite the perception among small farmers that the 
program placed them at a disadvantage, they nevertheless chose to embrace the plan 
in its entirety rather than sacrifice the benefit payments they “could not live 
without.”
40
 Their need resulted chiefly from excessive production, both foreign and 
domestic, and from Oklahoma’s unique disadvantages as the lowest rated state in 
cotton staple quality and lint yield per acre. Although many growers held sentiments 
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50 
reflected in Governor Murray’s anti-New Deal speech, they set aside this ideological 
opposition in order to address their own extreme economic necessity. Given the 
opportunity, many clearly would have opted for less restrictive methods of control 
but, finding none available, they willingly submitted to the legislation they viewed as 
their best hope for economic sustainability. 
For efficient, mechanized, and large-scale farmers, support of the 1938 
program proved a remarkably profitable decision. Through the end of the 1930s, they 
enjoyed fully restored parity prices by utilizing loan and benefit payments and by 
continuing to improve their production efficiency.
41
 Small landowners and tenant 
farmers, however, remained in poverty and failed to realize similar results.
42
 
Ultimately, the AAA needed only to sustain these farmers through the onset of World 
War II. Military supply needs raised prices in many regions to as high as 110% of 
parity levels. As Paul K. Conkin wrote in his 1968 classic, The ew Deal, “Before 
there was an ever-normal, permanently glutted market, World War II came to the 
rescue.”
43
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Revolt in the Corn Belt 
 
 
Finley Foster had little tolerance for what he viewed as government waste, 
and when agriculturalists in his area began accepting early New Deal subsidy 
payments for leaving their fields unplanted, he took a stand against the practice.  The 
“red-dirt” farmer from Illinois designed an enormous banner stretching the length of 
his fence that read, “THIS FARMER IS NOT ON GOVERNMENT RELIEF.”1 In 
Foster’s region, such national crop legislation met with widespread and, ultimately, 
overpowering resistance, organized by men who took similar offense at the attempted 
interference of Washington officials. The success of this opposition movement 
largely resulted from efforts of a group who called themselves the Corn Belt Liberty 
League (CBLL). This chapter examines their unique position among growers of the 
time and explores why they exhibited such unusual resistance to the legislation at 
issue.  
Three main factors propelled these corn farmers to action: an ideology of 
freedom and individual responsibility, a concern for personal economy, and a demand 
for fairness in the administration of federal regulations. League activities, convention 
speeches, resolutions submitted to Washington, and issues of their American Liberty 
Magazine clearly indicate such purposes. Members adamantly opposed centralized 
farm control, and, with their descendants currently accepting high levels of annual 
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subsidies, this deeper analysis will provide an enhanced understanding of the strongly 
negative response in 1938 and the subsequent transition made by these farmers 
toward a more positive interpretation of governmental assistance.2 
 The new Agricultural Adjustment Act affected corn farmers in a unique way 
because of its limited geographical scope. The text of the law delineated limitations 
for other crops on a nationwide basis, but corn only encountered control within the 
“commercial growing area,” which consisted of 566 counties in twelve states.3 
Significantly, the boundary contained a mere twenty-two percent of those raising the 
crop across the country.4 For comparative purposes, this targeted reduction would be 
akin to restricting cotton only within a specified region inside the state of Texas while 
leaving untouched all other growers in the cotton South. 
The corn provisions of the AAA contained language similar to those placed on 
other crops. Under the voluntary allotment system, corn farmers received an 
individual acreage allowance every year. Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace 
possessed the authority to annually establish and divide the national distribution of 
cornfields and he incentivized participation with federal loans and grants.5 This 
nonobligatory request for program compliance contrasted sharply with the second 
control mechanism, mandatory quota requirements. The harsh alternative went into 
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effect in cases when the secretary estimated annual production could rise above 115% 
of corresponding consumption. Some growers viewed this as an incentive for 
reducing output. If they did not exceed the projected yearly need, they would avoid 
triggering the compulsory portion altogether.6 Immediately upon enactment, the 
second program required a referendum similar to those used by cotton and tobacco 
but in this case, only those twenty two percent in the commercial growing area were 
eligible to vote. If corn farmers failed to pass the plan with the required two-thirds 
majority, they would be cut off from all loan and grant payments until the second 
growing year following the vote. However, if passed successfully, with the requisite 
two-thirds majority, all restrictions became mandatory and sales of corn in excess of 
an individual’s quota incurred a fine of fifteen cents per bushel. 7 
One can easily imagine that, as with any public policy issue, some affected 
persons might find this legislation objectionable, but the sheer magnitude and 
immediacy of the Illinois response existed in sharp contrast to that seen elsewhere 
and thus provides an excellent case study for comparison. In 1938, acreage 
allotments, in accordance with the default control plan, arrived in mailboxes in the 
commercial growing area beginning April 15, 1938.8 The initial outcry occurred, 
predictably, in the area facing the most dramatic cuts. Cornfields in Illinois were 
reduced by twenty-three percent overall although many counties suffered deeper 
decreases, as the oversight committees did not distribute acreage evenly across the 
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state. Compared to farmers in Kansas, with an overall thirty percent increase, Illinois 
losses deeply troubled the affected growers.9 Local farmers in McDonough County, 
Illinois, found themselves discussing their “ruinous” allotments on the street corners 
and soon decided to take action. On April 18, 1938, just a few days after postmen 
delivered the bad news, the central Illinois men agreed to host a meeting for those 
facing similar concerns. The overwhelming response surprised organizers when over 
1,500 farmers arrived to express their opposition to the AAA. The participants’ views 
surfaced immediately as each attendee received an opinion survey upon entry. Of the 
865 ballots distributed that evening, 824 indicated “no” in answer to the question 
“Are you satisfied with your present corn allotment?”10 At this meeting, the Corn Belt 
Liberty League officially formed. 
The organization initially claimed the concept of freedom in agriculture as 
their focus. The turnout at the first event encouraged newly elected President Tilden 
Burg to host a large-scale convention the following week in the Macomb armory to 
adopt bylaws and encourage the spread of the revolt. For this second gathering, 
organizers invited keynote speakers such as John E. Waters, former Soviet power-
farming instructor, to illustrate where centralized agriculture planning might lead.11 
After hearing of the number interested in attending and receiving many telegrams 
from those attempting to obtain seats for the meeting, event planners found it 
necessary to expand their original plans to accommodate the response. Anticipating  
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crowds, organizers strung loudspeakers along streets adjoining the armory to ensure 
the message was accessible to those who could not fit inside.12 Further preparations 
included roping off several roadways connected to the town square to create 
additional standing room and packing over 2,000 seats into the facility itself.13 On the 
night of the convention, over 3,500 farmers arrived from Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Minnesota, and Missouri to hear the message of the Corn Belt Liberty League. Those 
outside endured soaking rain as the meeting went on, but this did not deter many 
farmers anxious to participate in the movement. Throughout the course of the night, 
the group adopted several resolutions to clarify its position. Attendees affirmed a 
resistance pledge stating their firm resolve to consistently and ardently oppose the 
control program and to seek out other similarly minded cultivators who could offer 
assistance in this effort.14 Newspaper journalists reporting on the meeting the 
following day indicated thousands of farmers joined the organization that night, each 
paying the required two dollars in organization dues.15  
When new members returned home, they took with them a passionate 
opposition to the AAA. CBLL chapters formed nearly every week in counties across 
Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, and most other states in the commercial growing area. The 
local Macomb newspaper published long lists of meetings by county so existing 
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members could lend their support to newly developing satellite divisions.16 President 
Burg and founders such as G. C. James travelled to many of these gatherings to share 
their message of fighting for the freedom of cultivators.17 By mid-May 1938, when 
letters of support and official visits by county delegations overwhelmed the home 
offices of the president and secretary, national board members decided to open a 
permanent headquarters for their organization in the Illinois Theatre Building, near 
the site of the initial convention.18 Leaders also hired a stenographer to assist with the 
enormous influx of daily mail, repeatedly expressing shock and amazement at the 
rapid growth of their association. In almost every newspaper interview available, 
Burg and his followers marveled at their progress.19 Less than a month after the 
opening of the permanent location, the CBLL incorporated in both Illinois and 
Indiana and listed several goals in their charter and bylaws including “to preserve the 
independence of the American farmer… and to preserve the constitutional rights of 
those engaged in agriculture.”20 With an established business address and corporate 
credentials, the league could begin to consider publication as an effective method of 
ensuring the continued spread of their ideas.  
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Initially, the literature distributed by the CBLL came in the form of flyers, 
handbills, and ads in local newspapers.21 These proved to be valuable recruitment 
tools and board members watched the movement spread rapidly throughout the Corn 
Belt with forays down into Kansas and other neighboring states.22 Building on their 
early success with print advertising and encouraged by the overwhelming 
correspondence still received at headquarters, the group decided to attempt publishing 
their own periodical. Invoking patriotic spirit, they christened it The American Liberty 
Magazine and by fall, the first issue arrived at the homes of subscribers.23 The 
periodical developed into a powerful tool for disseminating League ideology but was 
also frequently used to share general farming advice and innovations. When R. H. 
Bruninga of Peoria County experimented with fattening his hogs on cheap oats 
instead of their usual corn, editors printed his story to help others preserve both their 
pig and grain operations.24 The paper also purported to perform a sort of fact-
checking function when members of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
delivered speeches in defense of Roosevelt’s legislation. The entire front page of the 
October twenty-first edition contained a line-by-line analysis of Secretary Wallace’s 
speech on behalf of the act delivered in Springfield, Illinois, the previous week. In 
addition to re-printing the speech, editors included all relevant portions of the law so 
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readers could determine for themselves whether Wallace presented it accurately.25 
Following the midterm elections of 1938, in which Republicans gained eighty-one 
seats in the House and six seats in the Senate, the publication revealed a political 
tendency previously unseen. A front-page headline standing six inches tall declared 
the Republican victory a reason to hope for relief from crop legislation, but writers 
insisted their magazine did not maintain a particular political affiliation in the article 
that followed.26 With such ideas surfacing in the organization’s main communication 
apparatus, the members’ philosophical basis for opposition to the act reveals itself. 
Participants in the movement viewed their struggle as first and foremost an 
ideological one. President Burg passionately summarized this view at the convention:  
Above all we are fighting for freedom. We positively refuse to accept 
the view that we must sacrifice freedom to obtain prosperity. On the 
other hand, we believe that loss of freedom means poverty and ruin. 
Turning our farms over to compulsory methods of farming cannot be 
the sound method of getting prosperity.27 
 
Opponents also desperately feared what they interpreted as socialist tendencies in the 
new law. Early organizers harbored so much concern about this particular aspect, they 
invited former Soviet farming instructor John E. Waters to speak about centralized 
control of agriculture at the major recruitment meeting. He had served as an employee 
of the communist government for approximately five years in the late 1920s and was 
quick to compare their socialist program to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, claiming 
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farmers would soon be subjugated into a “peasant class” and were “well on their way 
to dictatorship.”28 His concerns were certainly not unique among movement 
participants, well-known Kansas rancher Dan Casement  strongly decried the 
restrictions in the act when he stated “She’s blown up; that’s Russia at its worst.”29 
Senator Josiah Bailey called the AAA the “perfect model of fascism.”30 This fear of 
centralized control appealed even to those who were in favor of some form of 
assistance program and had the effect of greatly broadening the League’s base of 
support.31 
In addition to philosophical opposition, members exhibited grave concern for 
their personal economy. Early in the new act’s short life, agriculturalists in other crop 
categories realized that, while their staples such as cotton and tobacco faced quota 
restrictions, they could supplement that limited acreage by diversifying into wheat or 
planting corn. By virtue of living outside the commercial growing area, these 
cultivators faced no controls or restrictions on such grains and they immediately 
seized on the opportunity to diversify their crops. Competition from southern cotton 
farmers, who possessed fallow acreage and complete freedom to appropriate the grain 
previously considered exclusively Midwestern, emerged as a major source of 
apprehension in the pages of the American Liberty Magazine. Whether or not 
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southerners had a large impact on the national marketplace is a debatable question, 
but regardless of the merits of the argument, Corn Belt residents refused to be 
pacified. In September 1938, the publication carried a large front-page photograph of 
an Arkansas farmer selling the disputed commodity. He advertised it as “corn raised 
on cotton ground.”32 Chicago reporter Frank Ridgeway traveled to Mississippi in an 
attempt to assess the amount of corn being planted by southerners. His description of 
the situation could not have sounded encouraging to Midwestern farmers when he 
wrote, “The whole crop map of the cotton belt is undergoing a critical revision… On 
down the Mississippi river corn is ankle high in the Memphis region, and here in the 
Clarksdale neighborhood a few fields will soon be shooting ears.”33 This article, and 
those that followed, exacerbated CBLL concerns and propelled those in the restricted 
area to increase their planting to try and keep up.34 Legislators, concerned about 
dissatisfaction among their constituents, also strongly debated this topic on the floor 
of the House. A host of speeches indicate widespread concern that finally culminated 
in the so-called Corn v. Cotton Debate in which Representative Fred Gilchrist of Iowa 
attempted to ease the minds of each side.35 
Apart from their concerns regarding competition, farmers understood that, for 
some, compliance with allotments would lead to financial ruin. Mathematicians ran 
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calculations of benefit and loan payments against the profit resulting from a larger 
crop and even paying monetary penalties on quota violations appeared a more 
lucrative option than strict compliance. In a meeting at Princeton High School in 
Bureau County, Illinois, local leaders illustrated the probable returns of full-scale 
planting versus those available on unrestricted production: 
[Mr. Booth] showed that on 1,000 bushels at the guaranteed price of 
50 cents the cooperator would get $468, including the price of the 
grain sold and his benefit payment for curtailment whereas the non-
cooperating farmer would get $467 after he had sold the full 1,000 
bushels and had paid his fine for excess production. Going further, Mr. 
Booth illustrated with figures on the blackboard that should the bill 
work and the price rise to 75 cents a bushel, the non-cooperating 
farmer would get $717 from his crop whereas the co-operating farmer 
would get only $663 from his crop and benefit payments. “If the 
program works, you don’t want it,” Mr. Booth declared. “If it doesn’t 
work, it’s a good thing.”36 
 
This pragmatic response to the act swayed many agriculturalists otherwise unmoved 
by the ideologically-based rhetoric. Upon realizing noncompliance resulted either in 
identical or increased profits, they were much more sympathetic to the League’s 
cause. 
The belief that AAA officials unfairly administered the legislation created a 
third force driving the rebellion. Local Illinois wives submitted letters to the editor of 
the Daily Journal with numerous allegations of unequal allotment distribution and 
preferential treatment benefitting family members of Farm Bureau directors.37 
Examining the state-by-state breakdown of allotments provides insight into the 
fairness argument. When the bill first appeared before Congress, its authors indicated 
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the secretary of agriculture would not impose acreage cuts greater than twenty percent 
on any individual cultivator; however, states such as Illinois and Ohio received 
overall reductions of approximately twenty-five percent. These limits suggest that 
some landowners must, by necessity, have received curtailments deeper than twenty 
percent. In fact when approved cornfields were actually distributed many growers lost 
between twenty-five to seventy percent of their formerly available cropland. 38 
Allotments must also be considered in a state-by-state comparison. Kansas, for 
example, possessed an overall allowance equal to 130 percent of the acreage planted 
in the state the year before.39 From an Illinoisan’s perspective, had the secretary 
determined to leave Kansas at one hundred percent of their previous year, he could 
have offered the extra 500,000 acres (the additional thirty percent) to farmers in 
Illinois to ease their reduction. This disparity among allotments cast suspicion over 
the act as a whole and attracted many more people to the opposition cause. 
As 1938 drew to a close, the influence of the Corn Belt Liberty League 
emerged in several areas. The most obvious success enjoyed by the CBLL came when 
Washington declined to hold the referendum necessary for imposing marketing 
quotas.40 Secretary Wallace claimed the anticipated levels of production fell within 
the acceptable range but correspondence between league members suggests they 
                                                 
38 Speech by Rep. Andresen, Cong. Rec., 75th Cong., 3rd sess., 1938, vol. 83 pt. 1739. 
 
39 Speech by Rep. Andresen, Cong. Rec., 75th Cong., 3rd sess., 1938, vol. 83 pt. 1739. 
 





intended to take full responsibility for averting the disaster of the compulsory plan.41 
With a new year on the horizon, AAA administrators grew fearful of the results they 
would face at the annual referenda on quotas, and they began a fierce campaign to 
maintain quotas on other staples.42 Men like cotton and tobacco farmer W.C. Ransdell 
of North Carolina had tried to work with quotas for a year but found them not worth 
the trouble as he explained to a reporter immediately prior to the vote, calling quotas 
“too much candy for a cent. It requires a man to have too many bosses. There might 
be more money in it, but what of it, when it deprives me of a liberty I’ve had for 
seventy years.”43 By late December corn was not the only group celebrating release 
from crop control; shortly before Christmas, tobacco farmers voted four to one 
against reinstating their quotas for 1939.44 This showed an overwhelming change of 
sentiment compared with their vote of eighty-six percent in favor the previous 
March.45  
AAA opponents fought long and hard throughout 1938 to win the battle over 
this controversial legislation. League leaders often traveled over 150 miles from their 
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homes in Macomb, Illinois, to aid in organizational meetings for new chapters.46 
Some officeholders even remarked occasionally that they had to let work on their 
personal farms slip in order to keep up with the incredible demands of organizing 
such a movement.47 
Whether compliance with reduction demands might have brought farmers a 
higher financial return in 1938 is impossible to determine. Following the League’s 
triumph over marketing quotas that fall, their literature reveals a subtle shift in 
rhetoric indicating a lingering concern for their economic situation. In December 
1938, American Liberty Magazine began running a series of stories on the alcohol-
blended gasoline concept. Corn growers viewed this as a way their government could 
help them profit from crop surpluses without exerting unnecessary control over their 
daily operations.48 The benefits of such a non-intrusive program proved too great to 
ignore.  Authors quickly took up the cause citing ventures in England already 
manufacturing this fuel and persuasively illustrating the profits to be made from a 
gasoline blend with only ten percent alcohol.  49 These writers could not have known 
what success the future would bring but looking back, a modern reader can easily see 
the beginnings of current agriculture policy and gain a better understanding of the 
hardships that led growers away from their opposition movement and toward a more 
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cooperative and economically beneficial position similar to that held by many corn 
farmers today. 
Regardless of the economic necessities of later years, league members held 
firm to their convictions in 1938 including their strong passion for personal liberty on 
the farm and their belief that the farmer could best determine ways to improve his 
personal economy. Without facing the extreme overproduction experienced by cotton 
growers, Corn Belt farmers enjoyed greater freedom to express ideological opposition 
to the program they had less need of. Although some cotton men preferred programs 
that afforded them greater control over their acreage, many could not subsist without 
the assistance they received in the form of loans and benefit payments for their 
compliance with the AAA. Some of these men might have desired to support 
opposition groups such as the CBLL but instead made the economic decision to 
continue receiving the aid they had become dependent on. While the looming world 
war cut short the efforts of the Corn Belt Liberty League, participants took pride in 
the success their movement achieved in the late 1930’s when they planted their crop 






The Divergence of Cotton and Corn 
 
In 1938, American cotton farmers found themselves in a uniquely precarious 
position. They had struggled desperately to return to parity prices since the beginning 
of Hoover’s federal cotton program in 1929. Throughout the course of the intervening 
decade they faced an ebb and flow of prices with only one constant feature, all were 
disappointingly low.
1
 The tiny return on these farmers’ investments resulted chiefly 
from what Senator Bankhead called “the biggest surplus in world history.”
2
 Bankhead 
knew that cotton needed saving, that a carryover of 50,000,000 bales from the 
previous year could not be sold off overnight, and that even if demand increased, the 
surplus would last long enough to keep prices low for quite a while.
3
 With this 
despondent mindset, cotton farmers traveled to the polls to participate in AAA 
referenda. Faced with the threat of losing federal aid they did what Bankhead called 
“the only thing to do…” they reluctantly voted yes.
4
  
In addition to the challenging world market, growers in Texas and Oklahoma 
faced unique struggles including their declining yield per acre and the refusal of some 
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merchants to accept cotton from these regions in fulfillment of their contracts.
5
 These 
hardships inclined growers to accept any federal assistance offered at the time, even 
when it did not represent their preferred method of intervention. Since many 
expressly favored Domestic Allotment or another plan altogether, their approval of 
marketing quotas must first be seen as a gesture of economic necessity.
6
 
By comparison to those in the cotton South, Corn Belt farmers fared 
somewhat better in 1938. They anxiously calculated their potential profits under the 
new act and determined that whether production control successfully raised prices or 
not, those who refused to cooperate could potentially earn identical or even 
dramatically higher financial returns than those who complied.
7
 Combined with this 
realization, the knowledge that Wallace cut acreage in Illinois by twenty-five percent 
while offering Kansas a thirty percent net increase prompted an immediate negative 
reaction from local growers.
8
 They did not need this legislation. They certainly did 
not want it after seeing it implemented in a way they understood as grossly unfair. So, 
while their southern counterparts trudged to the polls to welcome yet another crop 
control plan, American corn farmers staged a revolt. Secretary Wallace nervously 
monitored the spread of the CBLL movement and the projected corn harvest in 1938 
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and when he determined there was not sufficient need to justify a referendum for the 
crop, both he and the revolting farmers breathed a sigh of relief.
9
 
As 1938 drew to a close, Wallace could see he needed to strongly emphasize 
the economic necessity argument if he hoped to maintain quotas on the crops then 
under the control plan.
10
 In pursuit of this course, he and other members of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration led a highly visible campaign, which chiefly 
begged farmers to trust the current system “until something better can be worked 
out.”
11
 Officials also appealed to farmers’ sense of camaraderie and shared fortune by 
calling the quota system “the only feasible plan by which income can be maintained 
for one-third of the nation’s farmers engaged in cotton production.”
12
 With thirty-
three percent of American cotton growers absolutely dependent on government aid, 
their dire need and survival-first mindset became clear. Wallace’s reliance on this fact 
as a means of convincing farmers to approve his plan only further substantiates the 
argument that need fundamentally influenced their voting behavior and compliance 
with the act. Memphis cotton man J. P. Chase expressed this sentiment clearly when 
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In the second set of referenda later that year, only cotton voted to continue 
laboring under marketing quotas in 1939. When asked about the results, officials 
called the cotton response an “[unreserved vote] for the principals of the farm act” but 
also quickly pointed out that they did not view quota failures in other crops as a 
rejection of their plan.
14
 Instead, Wallace called this response a form of “economic 
democracy” and explained that those growers would be welcomed back into the 
program the following year, should they find themselves in another desperate 
situation like that experienced by those in cotton.
15
 Here again, Wallace revealed his 
firm understanding that the best incentive for participation in the AAA was 
intolerable economic necessity. 
The secretary erred in naming the yes vote an “unreserved” endorsement of 
his plan. Letters from farmers in the field and responses at national meetings clearly 
indicate a preference held by some for alternative plans such as Domestic Allotment 
or indeed sometimes no plan at all.
16
 However, his assessment of the motivating 
power of economic necessity proved right on target when the cultivators in the 
greatest need voted yes again and again while those in a better economic position, 
refused to even go to the polls. 
While cotton farmers who disagreed with the AAA generally favored some 
type of modification to it, the upper Midwest rejected the plan altogether due to its 
unique regional restrictions on corn with the establishment of the “Commercial 
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 Despite the nearly inscrutable design of the farm bill, all AAA 
participants, regardless of the crop they grew, understood one thing very clearly. 
Artificial scarcity could not successfully raise prices unless everyone participated in 
reducing supply.
18
 Some cotton farmers recognized the problem of competing 
international production but most were satisfied that the legislation applied to all 
those engaged domestically in the cultivation of the fiber.
19
 Corn farmers did not 
enjoy a similar shared suffering. Only twenty-two percent of those raising the grain in 
1938 fell under the regulation of the AAA.
 20
 Thus, when faced with the possibility 
that they might incur fines on the sale of their regular crop while the competing 
seventy-eight percent of corn farmers sold their product under no restrictions or 
penalties, residents of the Commercial Growing Area saw no alternative but to fight 
the program in any way they could.
21
 
For all these reasons, from regional political differences to varying degrees of 
economic hardship, American farmers in 1938 met the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
with almost as many unique responses to it as there were farmers affected by it. 
Cotton farmers believed they could make the plan work. They saw no immediate 
alternative and understood their economic position to be so precarious that they could 
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not afford to reject federal crop loans and assistance when they most needed aid. Corn 
farmers on the other hand preferred their chances on the open market without 
penalties imposed on a particular twenty-two percent of their cultivators.  
When faced with the decision to embrace or reject the new plan, some called 
for alternatives, some wrote to federal legislators, some quietly altered their 
traditional planting and farming practices, but all sought the economic survival of 
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